



PAAI Executive Brief No 3

Whose Suffering Counts?

Media Attention, Moral Priorities, and Africa's Forgotten Wars

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There is a particular kind of violence in being invisible to the world and your region. It is not the violence of bullets, bombs, or drones, but the slower, quieter violence of indifference, the sense that one's suffering simply does not register on the scales by which the world measures tragedy.

For millions of Africans living through some of the deadliest conflicts of the twenty-first century, this is not an abstraction. It is daily life.

Since February 2026, global attention has been consumed by the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, layering itself atop already-saturated coverage of Ukraine and Gaza. What makes the Middle East case particularly stark is the economic dimension—specifically, the threat of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This is not merely a regional conflict or humanitarian crisis; it directly threatens global energy security, supply chains, and commerce.

These are real wars with real and devastating consequences, and they deserve the world's concern. But their dominance of the global conscience has come at a cost: the near-total eclipse of conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) wars that, by almost any measure of human suffering, rank among the gravest crises on our planet.

This is not a new pattern. It is, however, one of the starkest moral failures of our information age, and it deserves far more scrutiny than it receives. This brief examines this failure across three of the world's most severe conflicts and explores what is needed to address it.

Crises of staggering scale, Met with deafening silence

Consider Sudan. The human cost has been brutal by any standard: more than 150,000 people killed since the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces erupted in April 2023, with widespread reports of indiscriminate violence against civilians.¹

¹ Kristine Kolstad, "The Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan Explained," *Norwegian Refugee Council*, April 10, 2025, <https://www.nrc.no/feature/2025/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-sudan-explained>

According to the UN's 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan,² 33.7 million people there now require humanitarian assistance, the highest figure of any country in the world, and an increase of 3.3 million from the year before. That is roughly two-thirds of Sudan's entire population.³ Nearly 40% of the country's health facilities are no longer functional. Cholera, measles, malaria, and dengue spread largely unchecked through a population with minimal immunization coverage. More than 20 million people need health assistance.⁴ The UNHCR estimates that over 11 million people, one in five Sudanese, have been forcibly displaced, making Sudan home to the largest displacement crisis on the planet, with some 13.6 million people uprooted in total.⁵

By the numbers alone, UN agencies have described Sudan as the world's largest humanitarian crisis, surpassing Gaza, Yemen, and other major emergencies in terms of sheer scale.⁶

Consider another African country, Ethiopia. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in 2021 indicates 165,025 deaths in the war on Tigray,⁷ with total fatality estimates from the war on Tigray reached staggering levels, with estimates over 600,000,⁸ rendering it one of the deadliest years since the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi of 1994.⁹ During the war, over five million people were besieged and deliberately subjected to starvation as a weapon of war. The Commission of Inquiry on Tigray Genocide documented that 286,250 survivors were victims of sexual and gender-based violence¹⁰ and more than two million people were forcibly displaced from their homes.

² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 – Summary* (New York: OCHA, March 30, 2026), <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026-summary>

³ Vibhu Mishra, "Sudan War Leaves Millions Hungry and Displaced as Health System Nears Collapse," *UN News*, January 10, 2026, <https://reachingnews.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166738>

⁴ World Health Organization, *Sudan: WHO Health Emergency Appeal 2026* (Geneva: WHO, February 3, 2026), <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/sudan--who-health-emergency-appeal-2026>.

⁵ UNHCR, "Sudan Situation," Operational Data Portal, last updated June 1, 2026, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation>.

⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 – Summary* (New York: OCHA, March 30, 2026), <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026-summary>.

⁷ Magnus Öberg, Mert Can Yilmaz, and Lotta Themner, "UCDP Newsletter #9: The War in Tigray," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/newsletter/issue9.html>.

⁸ David Pilling and Andres Schipani, "War in Tigray May Have Killed 600,000 People, Peace Mediator Says," *Financial Times*, January 15, 2023, <https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7>

⁹ Magnus Öberg, Mert Can Yilmaz, and Lotta Themner, "UCDP Newsletter #9: The War in Tigray," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/newsletter/issue9.html>.

¹⁰ Commission of Inquiry on Tigray Genocide (CITG), *War-Induced Genocidal Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Tigray, Ethiopia*, vol. 1 (Mekelle: Commission of Inquiry on Tigray Genocide, October 2025), <https://citghub.org/war-induced-genocidal-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-in-tigray-ethiopia-vol-1/>

The UN has documented over 49 mass killings of civilians with perpetrators indicating "a clear intention"¹¹ to target the group based on ethnicity, including widespread sexual and reproductive violence with the explicit intent to destroy Tigrayan women's reproductive capacity¹² and the intent to destroy the Tigrayan ethnicity, starvation used as a weapon of war, and forced displacement.¹³

In the same vein, in 2021, the U.S. State Department drafted a declaration that the Ethiopian government's atrocities in Tigray constituted genocide, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the matter; the declaration was never released.¹⁴ Reports indicate that the Biden administration initially feared a "second Rwanda" scenario in Ethiopia's Tigray war¹⁵ and subsequently halted the genocide determination to pursue diplomatic engagement with Ethiopia instead.¹⁶

In the same year, 2021, the estimated number of deaths for Ukraine was 92,629.¹⁷ The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have undoubtedly had horrendous humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. Yet, when considering both the human toll and the level of attention paid to it, data suggests conflicts in Africa receive comparatively less international attention, and thus the international responses to these African crises have been woefully inadequate.

Another one of the world's longest crises, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is in pressing need of greater attention from the international community. For ten consecutive years, the DRC has been included on the Norwegian Refugee Council's annual list of the most neglected and ignored displacement crises worldwide. In 2025, only 27.4% of the necessary funding to address the DRC crisis was secured, marking the lowest funding rate in a decade. A decade earlier, the international community provided about \$55 per person in need in the DRC, but by 2025, this amount had dropped to less

¹¹ International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, *Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia*, UN Doc. A/HRC/51/46 (19 September 2022), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/51/46>.

¹² Physicians for Human Rights and the Organization for Justice and Accountability in the Horn of Africa, *"You Will Never Be Able to Give Birth": Conflict-Related Sexual and Reproductive Violence in Ethiopia* (Physicians for Human Rights, 2025), <https://phr.org/our-work/resources/you-will-never-be-able-to-give-birth-conflict-related-sexual-and-reproductive-violence-in-ethiopia/>.

¹³ Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, *"All of Us Are in Constant Hunger": Ethiopia's Responsibility for Starvation in Tigray* (New Haven: Yale Law School, June 2023), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/schell/document/all_of_us_are_in_constant_hunger.pdf.

¹⁴ Robbie Gramer, "U.S. Weighs Offering Economic Lifeline to Ethiopia Despite War Atrocities," *Foreign Policy*, March 9, 2023, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/09/us-ethiopia-war-tigray-aid-peace-agreement/>.

¹⁵ Katrina Manson, "US Feared 'Second Rwanda' in Ethiopia's Tigray War," *Financial Times*, November 29, 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7>.

¹⁶ Bryant Harris, "US Halts Decision on Genocide Designation to Pursue Diplomacy in Ethiopia," *The National*, December 1, 2021, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2021/12/01/us-halts-tigray-genocide-determination-to-pursue-ethiopia-diplomacy/>.

¹⁷ Magnus Öberg, Mert Can Yilmaz, and Lotta Themner, "UCDP Newsletter #9: The War in Tigray," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/newsletter/issue9.html>.

than \$33.¹⁸ The extent of suffering is immense. Over 26.6 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, making the DRC the largest food crisis globally in absolute terms. Nearly 15 million people need humanitarian aid, and more than 5.8 million have been internally displaced, primarily in the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, where the M23 rebel movement has been conducting a prolonged campaign of violence.¹⁹ In the conflict-ridden eastern regions, more than seven in ten healthcare facilities are either completely out of service or functioning only partially, resulting in rising rates of cholera, mpox, and deaths among mothers during childbirth.²⁰ The crisis in the DRC is not a recent development. Research indicates that between 1998 and 2007, an estimated 5.4 million²¹ excess deaths occurred in the country, representing one of the most catastrophic death tolls of the post-Cold War era.²² Even so, the DRC continues to receive far less media attention compared to conflicts that are deemed geopolitically important. The human costs of this limited coverage, including insufficient funding, unaddressed atrocities, and an entire generation of children denied access to education and healthcare, have been extensively recorded in both academic research and policy-related publications.

Despite the massive toll of major wars in Africa and the resultant human cost in casualties and humanitarian crises, these conflicts receive far less international attention than those in Ukraine or Gaza.

The Numbers Behind the Neglect

Ethiopia, along with Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ranks among the world's five most urgent humanitarian crises, marked by staggering levels of fatalities, atrocities, displacement, and economic devastation. Yet global media attention to these conflicts has been dramatically smaller than that devoted to Ukraine and Gaza.

¹⁸ Norwegian Refugee Council, "DR Congo on World's Most Neglected Displacement Crises List for Tenth Consecutive Year," June 4, 2026, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/dr-congo-on-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises-list-for-tenth-consecutive-year>.

¹⁹ European Commission, Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, "Democratic Republic of the Congo," last updated June 8, 2026, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/democratic-republic-congo_en; Lucky Iseghehi, N. S. George, and Sandra S. Phiri, "Protecting the Health of the Most Vulnerable in the Overlooked Democratic Republic of Congo Crisis," *Health Science Reports* 7, no. 8 (August 2024), <https://doi.org/10.1002/hsr2.70011>.


²⁰ OCHA, "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Response Plan 2026," ReliefWeb, January 28, 2026, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/facing-critical-funding-gap-humanitarian-community-drc-forced-strictly-prioritize-its-response-2026>.

²¹ International Rescue Committee, *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis* (New York: IRC, January 2008), <https://www.rescue.org/report/mortality-democratic-republic-congo-ongoing-crisis>.

²² Benjamin Coghlán et al., "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Nationwide Survey," *The Lancet* 367, no. 9504 (January 7, 2006): 44–51, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(06\)67923-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(06)67923-3).

Figure 1: Media coverage per day of humanitarian crises: Africa vs others

Media Coverage Per Day




Source: PAAI • Created with Datawrapper

Source: PAAI 2025, data from Media and Journalism Research Center

The disparities are not subtle. The war in Ethiopia's Tigray region alone produced roughly ten times the deaths recorded in Gaza, nine times those in Sudan, and twice those in Ukraine. And yet, in terms of global media coverage, Tigray received only 0.96% of attention, while Gaza commanded 58.5%, Ukraine followed with 19.43%, and Sudan trailed at 2.57%. In practical terms, this means Tigray received roughly 61 times less coverage than Gaza, 20 times less than Ukraine, and nearly three times less than Sudan — despite suffering a far higher death toll than all three.

Figure 2: Media coverage per people in humanitarian need: Africa vs others

Media Coverage per People



Source: PAAI • Created with Datawrapper

Source: PAAI 2025, data from Media and Journalism Research Center

This imbalance extends beyond any single conflict. According to research from the Media and Journalism Research Center, Gaza and Ukraine have averaged 58.5 and 19.4 articles per day, respectively, while some of the world's most devastating crises receive only a trickle of sustained coverage, Chad at 0.06 articles per day, the DRC at just 1.5.²³ These are not minor wars. They are catastrophes unfolding in near-total global invisibility.

Media neglect has a direct impact on the funding gap. Despite increasing needs, global humanitarian²⁴ assistance decreased for two years in a row. In 2023, the gap in global humanitarian funding hit a record \$31.5 billion. By 2025, this gap had expanded to \$29.5 billion, compared to total requirements of \$45.5 billion, resulting in a 64.9% shortfall. Crises in Africa, which are already underreported, bear a significant portion of this deficit. In 2025, approximately one in four humanitarian dollars was directed toward just three crises — Gaza, Ukraine, and Sudan — leaving a large number of African emergencies to vie for whatever resources remained.

Why the World Looks Away

The reasons behind this invisibility are layered and complex. In Ethiopia's case, a deliberate communication blackout imposed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments during the height of the Tigray conflict cut off much of the information flow that might have otherwise reached international audiences. But this is only part of the story. Structural biases embedded deep within international media systems do the rest of the work.

As media scholars have long documented, global humanitarian coverage is profoundly uneven, shaped not by the scale of suffering but by a calculus of geopolitical relevance.²⁵ A substantial body of academic literature provides cross-national, long-term evidence that conflicts deemed geopolitically significant attract extensive coverage and shape policy attention,²⁶ while many of the deadliest conflicts, especially those in the Global South, remain chronically underreported.²⁷

²³ Virgil Hawkins, "Bleating Lambs and Silent Spectators: The Geo-Politics of the Media and the Crisis in DRC," *Media, War & Conflict* 2, no. 3 (December 2009): 290–304, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635209340071>.

²⁴ Niklas Rieger, Mike Pearson, Suzanna Nelson-Pollard, and Elise Belcher, *Falling Short? Humanitarian Funding and Reform* (Bristol: Development Initiatives, October 2024), <https://devinit.org/resources/falling-short-humanitarian-funding-reform>.

²⁵ Virgil Hawkins, "Bleating Lambs and Silent Spectators: The Geo-Politics of the Media and the Crisis in DRC," *Media, War & Conflict* 2, no. 3 (December 2009): 290–304, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635209340071>.

²⁶ Virgil Hawkins, "Media Selectivity and the Other Side of the CNN Effect: The Consequences of Not Paying Attention to Conflict," *Media, War & Conflict* 4, no. 1 (April 2011): 55–68, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635210396126>; Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

²⁷ Jeffrey S. Bachman and Esther Brito Ruiz, "The Geopolitics of Human Suffering: A Comparative Study of Media Coverage of the Conflicts in Yemen and Ukraine," *Third World Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (2024): 24–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2228715>; Zhe Xu and Mengrong Zhang, "How News Media Visually Dehumanize Victims of Humanitarian Crises through Framing Disparities: A Quantitative

These patterns reflect what scholars describe as a hierarchy between "worthy" and "unworthy" victims in global governance and journalism.²⁸ The unspoken logic of newsworthiness rewards geopolitical proximity, the involvement of powerful states, dramatic and easily distributed imagery, and ideological resonance with Western audiences, far more than it rewards raw humanitarian need.²⁹ The result is a kind of structural invisibility imposed on violence and suffering across much of the Global South, revealing deep inequities in how the world's media apparatus assigns value to human life.³⁰

The global attention is inherently biased, shaped by editorial norms, algorithmic and platform dynamics, and geopolitical strategies that consistently emphasize certain tragedies over others.³¹ This bias results not only in an information gap but also in a moral failure, as it systematically undervalues African lives within the frameworks of international media, donor policies, and global governance.

The proliferation of digital and social media has not corrected this hierarchy. If anything, it has deepened it. Research on platform algorithms and content moderation shows that engagement-driven ranking systems amplify emotionally resonant, geopolitically familiar content, a dynamic that systematically disadvantages conflicts in the Global South. During the 2021 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, pro-Palestinian content was subject to documented algorithmic suppression across major platforms,³² while content about African conflicts rarely achieves sufficient engagement to trigger amplification in the first place.³³ Academic research documents what scholars term a "necropolitical governance of digital populations", a structuring of online visibility that determines whose deaths are seen and whose are rendered invisible. The internet was once imagined as the great equalizer of humanitarian attention. The evidence suggests it has instead become an additional layer of the same hierarchy it promised to disrupt.

Comparative Analysis," *International Communication Gazette* 86, no. 8 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1177/17480485231216583>.

²⁸ Matthew A. Baum and Yuri M. Zhukov, "Filtering Revolution: Reporting Bias in International Newspaper Coverage of the Libyan Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 3 (2015): 384–400, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314554791>.

²⁹ Matt Evans, "Framing International Conflicts: Media Coverage of Fighting in the Middle East," *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics* 6, no. 2 (September 2010): 209–233, https://doi.org/10.1386/MCP.6.2.209_1.

³⁰ Baden, C., & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. (2018). The search for common ground in conflict news research: Comparing the coverage of six current conflicts in domestic and international media over time. *Media, War & Conflict*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217702071>

³¹ Suzanne Franks, "Reporting Africa: Problems and Perspectives," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 2, no. 1 (2005): 19–34, <https://doi.org/10.16997/WPCC.46>

³² Kelly Lewis, "Necropolitical Governance of Digital Populations: Visibility, Race, and the Political Economy of Social Media," *Information, Communication & Society* 26, no. 12 (2023): 2349–2366, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2230260>.

³³ Norah Abokhodair, Yarden Skop, Sarah Rüller, Konstantin Aal, and Houda Elmimouni, "Opaque Algorithms, Transparent Biases: Automated Content Moderation during the Sheikh Jarrah Crisis," *First Monday* 29, no. 4 (April 2024), <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v29i4.13620>.

When Invisibility Becomes Policy: The Humanitarian Funding Collapse

Media neglect is not merely a cultural or ethical failure. It produces measurable, documented policy consequences. Academic literature on the CNN effect, which posits that media coverage drives humanitarian intervention, also establishes that the converse holds. Specifically, the lack of media coverage suppresses political will, reduces donor attention, and permits governments to disregard crises that remain unknown to the public.³⁴ The humanitarian funding data for Africa's forgotten wars confirms this directly. In Sudan, the UN estimates that only a fraction of the needed funds have been mobilized relative to need. In the DRC, the 2025 humanitarian response plan required \$2.5 billion to assist 11 million people, but less than 28% of funding was received, forcing the closure of over 1,000 nutrition centers and cutting monthly food assistance targets by as much as 73%. Approximately 1.5 million individuals were left without access to essential healthcare services due directly to gaps in funding in 2025. This represents the tangible consequence of being overlooked: not merely a lack of awareness, but deaths that could have been avoided.

A 2024 peer-reviewed article published as the world focused on Ukraine and Gaza documented that Sudan had descended into "one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent history," with an estimated \$2.7 billion needed for life-saving aid and protection. Yet only \$323 million was contributed at the time of writing.³⁵ This recurring pattern persists throughout the continent, repeating itself across successive crises without pause. In 2025, the global deficit in humanitarian aid totalled \$29.5 billion, a sum that represents no more than 1.12% of total worldwide military expenditure during that same period.³⁶ The resources exist. The political will, shaped in no small part by media attention, does not.

A Retreat from a Different Era

Perhaps most troubling is what this moment reveals about the trajectory of global concern. This disparity is not simply a media failure; it is symptomatic of a broader erosion in the world's willingness to engage with African crises at all, especially when set against the international mobilization once seen around Sudan in the early 2000s, or Ethiopia in the 1980s. Those crises, too, unfolded far from Western capitals. Yet they managed to break through, galvanizing public campaigns, celebrity advocacy, and sustained diplomatic pressure in ways that today's African wars simply have not.

³⁴ Piers Robinson, "The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?" *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (April 1999): 301–309; Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention* (London: Routledge, 2002).

³⁵ Hasballah Affan, Jennifer Goldhagen, and Abubaker Ibnauf Elkraïl, "Sudan: A Catastrophic Humanitarian Crisis Demanding Immediate Global Action," *BMJ Paediatrics Open* 8 (2024): e002893, <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjpo-2024-002893>.

³⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2025 (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2025), <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

The 2004 Darfur crisis sparked a mass public mobilization in the United States. The Save Darfur Campaign attracted over 1.1 million Facebook supporters³⁷ and generated sustained congressional pressure, culminating in Secretary of State Colin Powell's September 2004 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he became the first U.S. cabinet official to formally declare an ongoing conflict a genocide.³⁸ Ethiopia's 1983–1985 famine led to the globally broadcast Live Aid concert on July 13, 1985—a 16-hour event watched by an estimated 1.5 billion viewers in 110 countries, raising over \$127 million in famine relief and inaugurating a new era of celebrity humanitarian advocacy.³⁹ These interventions were imperfect and critiqued on multiple grounds, but they demonstrated that African crises could command sustained, high-level international attention when the mechanisms of public communication were properly engaged.

What has changed is not the scale of suffering; if anything, today's crises rival or exceed those of decades past. What has changed is the world's appetite for paying attention to it.

None of this is an argument for diverting attention from Ukraine or Gaza, whose populations endure real and immense suffering deserving of continued global solidarity. It is, instead, a call to expand the moral imagination of international media and policy attention, to recognize that human suffering does not diminish in importance simply because it occurs far from familiar geopolitical battlegrounds or fails to generate viral imagery.

Sudan's 33.7 million people in need, Tigray's hundreds of thousands of dead, and the DRC's enduring eastern conflict are not footnotes to the global story of war and atrocity in this decade. They are, by the data, near the center of it. Until international media and policy systems recognize them as such, the world will continue operating on a hierarchy of grief, one that quietly decides whose suffering counts, and whose does not.

The path forward requires structural intervention at multiple levels: investment on existing and new Pan African media outlets with independent editorial policies that offer sustained coverage of African and other underreported crises, donor frameworks that separate humanitarian funding from media salience, and platform accountability mechanisms that address the algorithmic suppression of Global South content. Moreover, African states and the AU need to work with existing African media outlets, providing financial and technical support, as well as access, paired with a commitment to genuine media freedom at home. This would enable coverage of pressing continental, national, and local issues, offering an African narrative on both African and global affairs.

³⁷ Jens Meierhenrich, Evan Lewis, and Mary Gray, "The Darfur Advocacy Movement: Origins and Outcomes," *Sociological Science* 1 (2014): 1–27, <https://doi.org/10.15195/v1.a1>.

³⁸ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 108th Cong. (September 9, 2004) (testimony of Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg96896/html/CHRG-108shrg96896.htm>.

³⁹ Live Aid 1985: How It All Happened," BBC Music, June 3, 2005, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/music/thelive8event/liveaid/history.shtml>; "Live Aid," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, last modified 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Live-Aid>.

The world's attention is not limitless, and the emergence of new crises, including the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, will only intensify the competition for it; all the more reason to build structural frameworks that ensure Africa's forgotten wars are not the first casualties of that competition.

The most fundamental step, however, is more straightforward than any of these, it is simply the willingness to take notice. Sudan, the DRC, and Ethiopia's Tigray region are not minor side notes in the story of global history; they are at its very heart. The responsibility to justify indifference should rest with those who choose to avert their gaze, not with those who endure their suffering in silence.

This brief does not diminish the significance of that conflict; it asks only that its dominance of global attention not come at the cost of Sudan, Ethiopia, and the DRC, crises that, by every measure of human suffering, deserve equal urgency.

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